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Abstract—This paper presents a framework for converting
wireless signals into structured datasets, which can be fed
into machine learning algorithms for the detection of active
eavesdropping attacks at the physical layer. More specifically,
a wireless communication system, which consists of K legal
users, one access point (AP) and one active eavesdropper, is
considered. To cope with the eavesdropper who breaks into the
system during the uplink phase, we first build structured datasets
based on several different features. We then apply support vector
machine (SVM) classifiers and one-class SVM classifiers to those
structured datasets for detecting the presence of eavesdropper.
Regarding the data, we first process received signals at the AP
and then define three different features (i.e., MEAN, RATIO and
SUM) based on the post-processing signals. Noticeably, our three
defined features are formulated such that they have relevant
statistical properties. Enabling the AP to simulate the entire
process of transmission, we form the so-called artificial training
data (ATD) that is used for training SVM (or one-class SVM)
models. While SVM is preferred in the case of having perfect
channel state information (CSI) of all channels, one-class SVM
is preferred in the case of having only the CSI of legal users.
We also evaluate the accuracy of the trained models in relation
to the choice of kernel functions, the choice of features, and the
change of eavesdropper’s power. Numerical results show that the
accuracy is relatively sensitive to adjusting parameters. Under
some settings, SVM classifiers (or even one-class SVM) can bring
about the accuracy of over 90%.
Index terms—Physical layer security, active eavesdropping,
machine learning, support vector machine (SVM), one-class
SVM, artificial training data.
I. INTRODUCTION
OVER the last few years, we have witnessed an increasinginterest in the topic of physical layer security (PLS)
in wireless communication systems (WCSs). Different from
security methods at upper layers, the PLS relies on the
random nature of wireless channels in order to deal with
eavesdroppers [1]. In the context of PLS, two different types
T. M. Hoang was with the School of Electronics, Electrical Engineering
and Computer Science, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast BT7 1NN, UK.
He is now with the School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of
Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ, UK (e-mail: tiep.hoang@soton.ac.uk).
T. Q. Duong, and E. Garcia-Palacios are with the School of Elec-
tronics, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Queen’s Univer-
sity Belfast, Belfast BT7 1NN, UK (e-mail: trung.q.duong@qub.ac.uk,
e.garcia@ee.qub.ac.uk).
H. D. Tuan is with the University of Technology Sydney, Ultimo, NSW
2007, Australia (e-mail: tuan.hoang@uts.edu.au).
S. Lambotharan is with the Wolfson School of Mechanical, Manufacturing
and Electrical Engineering, Loughborough University, United Kingdom (e-
mail: S.Lambotharan@lboro.ac.uk).
L. D. Nguyen is with Duy Tan University, Da Nang 550000, Vietnam (e-
mail: nguyendinhlong1@duytan.edu.vn).
of eavesdroppers are often discussed: i) passive eavesdroppers
who only listen and ii) active eavesdroppers who break into
WCSs by impersonating legal users. It is shown that an active
eavesdropper is more dangerous than a passive one, because
the amount of information leaked to the active eavesdropper is
larger [2]–[5]. So far, numerous works have been conducted to
deal with active eavesdropping. One of the promising solutions
is the detection of eavesdroppers’ presence.
In fact, if a transmitter is not aware of the eavesdroppers’
presence, then it might naively broadcast signals without a
doubt. If this transmitter becomes wiser and is aware of
security risks, then it can generate artificial noise to interfere
with eavesdroppers but this method consumes a portion of
power budget [6]. On the contrary, if a transmitter can detect
eavesdroppers, then it can design more suitable strategies to
deal with eavesdroppers. In short, intrusion detection is a
matter of importance that needs to be addressed in all security
problems as a whole and in PLS-related problems in particular.
Among the most attractive topics are the methods of wire-
less network intrusion detection. For example, [7] suggests
using carrier frequency offset (CFO) along with Kalman
filtering, and [8] suggests channel probing and hypothesis
testing. However, machine learning is out of the context of
these works. Also in need of detecting network intruders,
recent works pay attention to the application of machine
learning due to its huge potential in the era of big data
and fifth generation (5G) networks. For example, [9] uses
Q-learning and Dyna-Q in combination with game theory.
Meanwhile, [10] applies Q-learning, which is a reinforcement
learning technique, to the PLS in vehicular ad-hoc networks.
In [11], extreme learning machine, which is an algorithm for
single hidden layer feedforward neural networks, has been
introduced and contributed to the field recently. The work in
[12] considers two types of supervised learning (i.e., support
vector machine (SVM) and Fisher’s linear discriminant anal-
ysis (Fisher’s LDA)) to classify channels in order to identify
the eavesdropper’s channel. SVM is also applied to the PLS in
smart grid in [13], while in-situ machine learning is applied in
[14]. In short, a range of different machine learning algorithms
has been applied to the PLS in WCSs.
Having said that, the investigations are incomplete, and
many PLS-related aspects remain lacking. The works in
[9]–[14] do not consider wireless propagation models (i.e.,
the relation between transmitted signals and received signals
through wireless channels); thus, there is no understanding
of transmitting and receiving signals. In fact, these works
fail to show the way signals are processed and the way data
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2is collected from wireless signals. Only [15] relates wireless
propagation to data that is fed to machine learning algorithms.
Similar to [15], we also consider the transmission process with
the relation between transmitted and received signals, and then
create data from the received signals. Unlike [15] that uses
Gaussian mixture models for classification tasks, we use SVM
models and one-class SVM (OC-SVM) models in this paper.
When it comes to creating features for data from wireless
signals, the cited works [10]–[14] suggest several approaches
to detecting eavesdroppers. For example, [10] suggests using
received signal strength (RSS) indicator, MAC address, and
arrival time of a packet as three features of a data point.
[12] also considers three features including arrival time. The
two remaining features defined in [12] are based on RSS and
Z-transform. In [11], the feature space is constructed based
on formulating the Pearson correlation coefficient and the
Euclidean distance between two samples. In [13], each feature
has a certain distribution that is fitted to preprocessed data.
While [15] considers channel estimation and use the normal-
ized magnitudes of estimated channels as the features of input
data. Besides, in-phase and quadrature (I-Q) components along
with CFO can also be used to create features [14]. However, so
far there have not been any standard frameworks for building
the features of a dataset, especially in the joint topic of PLS
and machine learning. This leads to a gap between the PLS and
machine learning. Accordingly, a question arises: how wireless
PLS signals can be processed before being entering into a
machine learning algorithm for intrusion detection? Since the
data is among the most important pillars of machine learning
[16], it is necessary to answer this question.
In this work, we present a framework of creating the data
from wireless PLS signals such that all the features of the
data have statistical properties. Using the newly-created data,
we detect active eavesdropping attacks with the help of SVM
and OC-SVM. From a PLS-related point of view, this paper is
pioneering in using SVM and OC-SVM models for intrusion
detection in WCSs. Specifically, our contributions can be listed
as follows.
• We process the received signals by transforming them
into a structured dataset, which consists of three differ-
ent features (namely, MEAN, RATIO and SUM). The
features are formulated such that they are associated with
certain constants. Moreover, data points in a feature col-
umn satisfy the requirement that the newer data point, the
closer to the corresponding constant it reaches (especially
when compared to the oldest data points).
• In relation to training data, we build up the so-called
artificial training data (ATD). Based on the channel state
information (CSI) of channels, we formulate two types of
the ATD. If the CSI of eavesdropping channel is known,
then the ATD with two classes will be formulated and
then be used for training SVM models. If the CSI of
eavesdropping channel is unknown, the ATD with only
one class will be formulated and then be used for OC-
SVM models. Noticeably, the ATD introduced in this
paper can also be fed to other types of supervised learning
and unsupervised learning models.
• Respectively using SVMs and OC-SVMs, we evaluate the
TABLE I
NOTATION
Symbols Meanings
R, H Input space and feature space, respectively.
φ(xs) The image of a training sample xs in H.
K (xs,x) The kernel function that computes the inner
products between φ(xs) and φ(x) in H.
C The regularization parameter in SVM.
γ The parameter that appears in kernel func-
tions, e.g., radius basis function (RBF),
polynomial, and sigmoid kernels.{
ϕ
(i)
k
}2
i=1
The ideal features of training data used
to check if an eavesdropper is attacking
user k. These two features are theoretically
formulated.{
f
(i)
k [t]
}3
i=1
The practical features of the t-th training
sample in training data. These three features
are formulated based on post-processing
signals.{
f̂
(i)
k
[
t̂
]}3
i=1
The features of the t̂-th training sample in
ATD.
T When a certain pilot is requested for authen-
tication during uplink phase, it is repeatedly
sent T times.
T̂ The number of artificial training samples
that are stuck with the label (#1) (or the
label (#0)).
Ttot The total number of training samples that
are fed into SVM algorithms. In numerical
results, Ttot = 2T̂ .
(#1), H1 There is an eavesdropping attack.
(#0), H0 There is not any eavesdropping attack.
performance of our approach to detecting eavesdropper’s
attacks. Comparing four different kernel functions, we
point out the most stable kernel function that is least
affected by the change of SVM (and/or OC-SVM) co-
efficients , and the worst kernel function that changes
fast with SVM (and/or OC-SVM) coefficients.
• We show that the probability of successful detection
increases with the eavesdropper’s power. In parallel, we
present the relation between the eavesdropper’s power
and the selection of SVM (and/or OC-SVM) parameters.
Notations: sign(z) = 1 if z > 0 and sign(z) = −1 if z ≤ 0.
Vectors and matrices are represented with lowercase boldface
and uppercase boldface, respectively. [·]T and [·]† denote the
transpose operator, and Hermitian operator, respectively. IL is
the L × L identity matrix. ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm.
z ∼ CN (0, IL) denotes a complex Gaussian random vector
z ∈ CL×1 with zero-mean and covariance IL. Ev1,...,vM {·}
denotes expectation over some variables v1, . . . ,vM . Some
important symbols are defined in Table I, while the remaining
symbols will be defined whenever used.
II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SVM AND OC-SVM
A. The Development of Typical Models
In the 1960s, the perceptron was suggested using the func-
tional relation l = sign (〈w, r〉+ b) between the input vector
r ∈ R ⊆ Cn×1 and the output value l. Herein, l is referred
to as the label for the input vector r and yet, assigning a
3Fig. 1. Using kernel methods, the data in the input space can become more
linearly separable in a higher-dimensional space.
value (either 1 or −1) to l implies the classification of the
input vector. For example, if l = 1 means that r has some
attribute A, then l = −1 can be used to show that r is not
of that attribute A. Due to the above-mentioned functional
relation, the input space R is separated into two regions by
the hyperplane 〈w, r〉−b = 0. In a region, l can take the value
1. In the other region, the value of l is (−1). Given that the
binary classification depends on the position of the separating
hyperplane, during the learning process the perceptron seeks
the most suitable coefficients w and b such that assigning a
value to l (i.e. classifying r) is as optimal as possible.
By replacing sign(·) with the continuous sigmoid functions,
such as tanh(·), multi-layer perceptrons (MLPs) were formed.
Among other classifiers are support vector machines (SVMs)
that provide better results than the classical MLPs in many
cases [17]–[19]. Various SVM classifiers are constructed based
on different types of kernel functions, such as the radial basis
function (RBF) kernel and the sigmoid kernel. The role of
kernel functions are significant in terms of calculation and
execution time. Moreover, the advantages of SVM classifiers
include the ability to work well on small data sets.
B. Kernel Methods
Prior to describing the working mechanism of SVMs, we
will clarify the role of kernel functions in SVM classifiers.
Let φ(·) : R → H be a nonlinear mapping that stretches
the input space R to a higher-dimensional space H (the
feature space). If xt ∈ R and xt′ ∈ R, then the inner
productK (xt,xt′) = 〈φ(xt), φ(xt′)〉 is a kernel function [20],
[21]. The main rationale for using the kernel function is that
once it has been given beforehand, one can directly compute
K (xt,xt′) from xt and xt′ without necessarily having explicit
expressions for φ(xt) and φ(xt′) during learning. That helps
to accelerate the computational speed. Moreover, the kernel
function allows us to avoid working in R; instead, we only
evaluate the input samples using the inner product in H.
From the viewpoint of data classification, the map φ(·) can
help to convert linearly inseparable data (in R) into the data
with linearly separable structures (in H) [21]. As an example,
Figure 1 illustrates the reason for mapping data points in R
to the associated data points H.
Fig. 2. A dataset, with two types of samples, is separated by a separating
hyperplane. The ω-th sample, which is positioned at xω , will be labelled as
(#1) (or lw = +1) if it lies above the separating hyperplane. Otherwise, it
will be labelled as (#0) (or lw = −1).
C. Classification based on Classical SVM
The binary classification problem based on SVM can be
formulated as follows [21], [22]:
min
w,b
1
2
‖w‖2 (1a)
s.t. lω (〈w,xω〉+ b) ≥ 1 (1b)
where xω is the position vector of the ω-th sample, ω ∈
Ω , {1, 2, . . . , Ttot}, and Ttot is the total number of training
samples. lω = +1 if xω is labelled as (#1); otherwise, lω = −1
if xω is labelled as (#0).
As illustrated in Figure 2, the samples are separated by a
separating hyperplane that takes the form of h(x) = 〈w,x〉+
b = 0. The separating hyperplane is in the middle of two
margins, and the Euclidean distance between the two margins
is equal to 2/‖w‖. The goal of (1) is to maximize the margin
width 2/‖w‖, such that the samples are correctly separated.
Note that the maximizing 2/‖w‖ is equivalent to (1a), while
the correct separation is equivalent to (1b).
Let Ω(#0) and Ω(#1) denote the set of indices {ω ∈ Ω|lω =
−1} and the set of indices {ω ∈ Ω|lω = 1}, respectively.
If (1) has optimal solutions w = w? and b = b?, then
we say that X = {(xω, lω) |ω ∈ Ω} are linearly separable.
In this case, there exists at least one separating hyperplane
that separates the samples into two sub-sets, i.e., X(#0) ={
(xω, lω) |ω ∈ Ω(#0)
}
and X(#1) = X \ X(#0). Furthermore,
the optimal separating hyperplane among possibly separating
hyperplanes will have the following equation:
h?(x) = 〈w?,x〉+ b? = 0. (2)
Note that x in (2) is not necessarily the same as xω (ω ∈ Ω).
A certain labelled sample xω (ω ∈ Ω) only lies on the optimal
hyperplane if it satisfies h?(xt) = 0. Through the hyperplane
h?(x), the input space is divided into two sub-spaces. While
one sub-space contains all samples xω ∈ X(#0), the other
sub-space contains all samples xω ∈ X(#1).
It should be noted that (1) may not work in numerous
practical scenarios because the labelled samples are linearly
inseparable. In this case, classification tasks simply fail to
work and no hyperplane can be found. For this reason, the
4use of kernel methods will make classification tasks become
easier when inseparable data can be translated into the feature
space in which the structure of data becomes more separable
[20]–[22].1 Thus, we will replace xω in (1) with the function
φ(xω) so as to avoid working directly in the input space. A
problem is that the transformed data may remain inseparable.
To overcome this difficulty, slack variables ξω ≥ 0 are added
to the classification problems (see [23] and [24, ch.7]). This
breakthrough method has become the background of SVM-
based classification methods [23]. Following this method, one
can change the original problem (1) over to the following:
min
w,b,ξt
1
2
‖w‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
regularizer
+C
Ttot∑
ω=1
ξω︸ ︷︷ ︸
error
(3a)
s.t. lω (〈w, φ (xω)〉+ b) ≥ 1− ξω (3b)
where C is the regularization/margin parameter. (3) is called a
L1 soft-margin SVM. If ξω = 0 for ∀ω ∈ Ω, then (3) reduces
to the hard-margin SVM (1). Otherwise, with ξω 6= 0, we
accept that the ω-th sample xω can be misclassified [20, Ch.2].
In literature, (3) is transformed into an equivalent optimization
problem through the use of Lagrangian function and Karush–
Kuhn–Tucker conditions [20], i.e.,
max
a1,...,aT
Ttot∑
ω=1
aω − 1
2
Ttot∑
ω=1
ω′=1
aωaω′ lωlω′K (xω,xω′) (4a)
s.t.
T∑
ω=1
aωlω = 0 (4b)
0 ≤ αω ≤ C, ω ∈ Ω (4c)
where K (xω,xω′) , 〈φ(xω), φ(xω′)〉 is the kernel function.
Remark 1. Any data point for which aω = 0 will not
contribute to predictions for new data points, thus only the
data points for which aω 6= 0 are called SVs. Any data point
for which 0 < aω < C is called an unbounded SV. Also,
any data point for which aω = C is called a bounded SV.
While the unbounded SVs lie on the margins, the bounded SVs
are between the two margins (see [20, p.24]). In addition, we
denote S as the set of indices of all SVs, U as the set of
unbounded SV indices, and S \ U as the set of bounded SV
indices. Note that U ⊆ S ⊆ Ω.
The equation of the optimal hyperplane is given by
h(?|SVM)(x) =
∑
s∈S
aslsK (xs,x) + b (5)
where b is calculated for unbounded SVs (see [20, ch.2] or
[24, (7.37)])
b =
1
|U |
∑
u∈U
(
lu −
∑
s∈S
aslsK (xs,xu)
)
. (6)
Note that in (5)–(6), xs is the s-th SV. Meanwhile, xu is
the u-th unbounded SV. Due to U ⊆ S , we have the fact
1Once again, Figure 1 illustrates the role of kernel methods in translating
inseparable data points in the two-dimensional space into separable data points
in the three-dimensional space.
{xu|u ∈ U} ⊆ {xs|s ∈ S}. For the kernel K (xs,x), we will
consider four specific functions in Section V for comparison
purposes.
D. Classification based on OC-SVM
Slightly different from classical SVM models, an OC-SVM
model is described as follows [25]–[27]:
minimize
w,ρ,ξi
1
2
‖w‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
regularizer
+
1
νTtot
Ttot∑
w=1
ξw − ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
error
(7a)
subject to 〈w, φ(xw)〉 ≥ ρ− ξw. (7b)
Herein, ρ is an offset parameter determining the distance from
the origin to the hyperplane, ν ∈ (0, 1] is a parameter balanc-
ing the maximal distance from the origin and the number of
data points in the region created by the hyperplane [26]. Each
ξw ≥ 0 is a slack variable, and φ(·) : X → F is a mapping that
tretches the input space X to a higher-dimensional space F
(namely, the feature space). Once this minimization problem
has been solved, the decision function will be given by
y(x) = sign
(
wTφ(x)− ρ) . (8)
According to [27], most of the data points are put into a region
(e.g., a ball) and these data points in the set {x1, . . . ,xTtot}
will be labelled +1. At the same time, any data point outside
the region will be referred to as outliers. Consequently, some
true outliers might be possibly misclassified when being put
inside the region. In short, the use of OC-SVMs is to create a
region for most of the data points in X . While the remaining
ones lie outside the region and are considered as being
associated with eavesdropping attacks.
III. COLLECTING WIRELESS SIGNALS
AND CREATING/DEFINING FEATURES
While the previous section presents useful tools for clas-
sifying new data, this section shows the process of creating
relevant features and then forming datasets.
A. Collecting Wireless Data
We consider a system with one access point (AP) and K
users in the presence of an active eavesdropper (Eve). Each
node is equipped with a single antenna and all nodes are
randomly positioned. Let the channel between the AP and the
k-th user be gk. Similarly, the channel between the AP and Eve
is denoted by gE. The transmission includes 2 phases: Uplink
phase for authentication and downlink phase for confidential
data transmission.
1) Uplink Phase: For the purposes of authentication and
channel estimation, the AP requests legal users to send pilot
vectors before it transmits confidential messages in return. The
k-th user (or user k) is assumed to send some pilot vector pk
to the AP. Herein, pk ∈ CL×1 is a column vector with L
entries. By assuming L ≥ K, we can design K orthogonal
pilot vectors such that p†kpk′ = 0 for k 6= k′ and ‖pk‖2 = 1.
If Eve wants to overhear the signal sk that is intended for the
5Complex values
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Signal processing
Machine Learning
User 1
User 2
User K
Eavesdropper
Access point
Creating features from signals
Based on the post-processing signals,
we  define  different  features,  which 
then form data tables.
Criteria: 
 - Features have statistical properties
 - The  more  training  samples ,   the 
 more accuracy.
Testing Data Artificial Training
Data (ATD)
Fig. 3. System model. At the stage (?), the AP forms the ATD by imitating the uplink phase and simulating signal processing. Using machine learning
algorithms, the AP has the trained models and uses them for predicting the testing data at the stage (??).
k-th user, Eve will design her pilot sequence pE as the same
as pk and will send pE to the AP (see [5] and [28]). After
receiving pilots from legal users and Eve, the AP considers
these pilot as the requests for information. Consequently, in the
downlink, the AP will send the confidential signal sk, which
is intended for user k, to both user k and Eve. That causes
the secret information between the AP and the k-th user to be
leaked to Eve.
At some instance t, the AP receives the following signal
yp[t] =

√Lρu
∑K
k=1 pkgk[t] + n[t], non-attack√Lρu
∑K
k=1 pkgk[t] +
√LρEpEgE[t]
+n[t], attack
. (9)
where ρu , Pu/N0 and ρE , PE/N0. Herein, Pu and PE
are the average transmit power of each user and that of Eve,
respectively; while N0 is the average noise power per a receive
antenna. n is an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector
with n ∼ CN (0, IL). Note that yp[t], gk[t], gE[t] and n[t] are
the realizations of yp, gk, gE and n at time t, respectively.
2) Downlink Phase: In the downlink phase, the AP trans-
mits signals to legal users. Of course, Eve also receives the
signals intended for user k because the AP assumes that two
legal users (i.e., user k and Eve) are requesting the same
messages. Recall that the AP may not be aware of the presence
of Eve and her attacks.
It is shown that the data rate of user k reduces when Eve
breaks into the uplink phase (see [5] for more details). In
other words, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the k-th user,
denoted as snrk, reduces with the increase in Eve’s power.
Consequently, the difference between the data rate of user k
and the data rate of Eve, namely the security rate, also becomes
lower.
As such, it is crucial that we must be able to detect the
presence of Eve in the uplink phase. Once the AP has identi-
fied an eavesdropping attack, it will be able to design suitable
strategies, such as the use of beamforming and artificial noise,
to deal with Eve. Herein, we do not delve into such strategies
in the downlink phase because this topic is plentiful in the
literature (see [5] and references therein). Instead, the SVM-
based methods of detecting active eavesdropping attacks in the
uplink phase will be considered only.
B. Creating Features/Attributes
By projecting yp[t] along the pilot vector p
†
k, we have the
post-processing signal yk[t] = p
†
kyp[t], i.e.
yk[t] =

√Lρugk[t] + p†kn[t], non-attack√Lρugk[t] +
√LρEgE[t] + p†kn[t], attack
.
(10)
Proceeding with defining zk[t] , |yk[t]|2, the AP can calculate
ϕ
(1)
k , Et {zk[t]} , (11)
ϕ
(2)
k ,
Et {zk[t]} − Et
{∣∣∣p†kn[t]∣∣∣2}
Et
{∣∣∣p†kn[t]∣∣∣2} (12)
based on the sufficiently statistical knowledge of {gk}Kk=1 and
gE. Note that Et {·} ≡ E{gk}Kk=1,gE,n {·} due to the dependence
of {gk}Kk=1, gE and n on t.
In practice, if user k sends its pilot vector pk to the AP
T times,2 then the AP will have T different values zk[1],
. . ., zk[T ]. Using these values, the AP will make a structured
dataset that consists of the following two features:
• Feature 1 (MEAN):
f
(1)
k [T ] ,
1
T
T∑
t=1
zk[t] =
 f
(1)
k|H0 [T ], non-attack
f
(1)
k|H1 [T ], attack
. (13)
Herein, H0 implies that there is not any eavesdropping
attack. Meanwhile, H0 implies an eavesdropping attack.
2Herein, pk is repeatedly sent for authentication.
6Fig. 4. An illustration of the data points in the ATD before normalization. The red circles are labelled as (#1), while the cross markers are labelled as (#0).
• Feature 2 (RATIO):
f
(2)
k [T ] ,
∑T
t=1 zk[t]−
∑T
t=1 |p†kn[t]|2∑T
t=1 |p†kn[t]|2
=
 f
(2)
k|H0 [T ], non-attack
f
(2)
k|H1 [T ], attack
. (14)
Statistically, if the AP receives the sufficient number of sam-
ples (i.e., if T is large enough), we can reach
f
(1)
k [T ]
large T≈ ϕ(1)k , (15)
f
(2)
k [T ]
large T≈ ϕ(2)k . (16)
The AP can request that the pilot vector pk has to be sent
T times by user k for the purpose of threat detection. In
doing that, the AP will have {zk[1], . . ., zk[T ]}Kk=1. From
this sequence, we can calculate the sum
T∑
t=1
zk[t] = Tf
(1)
k [T ]
large T≈ Tϕ(1)k (17)
using (13) and (15). In the case of an eavesdropping attack,
the sum is equal to Tf (1)k|H1 [T ]. Otherwise, the sum is equal
to Tf (1)k|H0 [T ]. Herein, the absolute difference between the
two cases is T
∣∣∣f (1)k|H1 [T ]− f (1)k|H0 [T ]∣∣∣, which increases with T .
Obviously, the larger T , the larger difference. Based on what
has just been observed, we suggest creating another feature
that relates to the sum of {zk[1], . . ., zk[T ]} as follows:
• Feature 3 (SUM):
f
(3)
k [T ] ,
T∑
t=1
zk[t] =
 f
(3)
k|H0 [T ], non-attack
f
(3)
k|H1 [T ], attack
. (18)
Remark 2. The features 1 and 3, i.e., MEAN and SUM, are
not exactly the same, although (13) can be calculated from
(18) or vice versus. The difference lies in that when T is large
enough, f (1)k [T ] will converge to a certain constant ϕ
(1)
k , but
f
(3)
k [T ] will tend to increase its value. In other words, with a
very large value of T , f (1)k [T ] will be independent of T , while
f
(3)
k [T ] will be linearly dependent on T . Intuitively, the third
feature is expected to make data more separable than the first
TABLE II
TESTING DATA: T POINTS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE LABEL (#0) AND T
POINTS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE LABEL (#1).
Fearture 1 (MEAN) Fearture 2 (RATIO) Fearture 3 (SUM)
f
(1)
k|H0 [1] f
(2)
k|H0 [1] f
(3)
k|H0 [1]
...
...
...
f
(1)
k|H0 [T ] f
(2)
k|H0 [T ] f
(T )
k|H0 [T ]
f
(1)
k|H1 [1] f
(2)
k|H1 [1] f
(3)
k|H1 [1]
...
...
...
f
(1)
k|H0 [T ] f
(2)
k|H0 [T ] f
(T )
k|H0 [T ]
feature. However, it seems to be impractical to take a very
large value of T , because the AP should not request users to
send pilot sequences too many times for authentication. Thus,
it is questionable whether SUM is really a more desirable
feature than MEAN in terms of implementation, with a limited
value of T . In Subsection V-A, this concern will be clarified.
In short, we can create a testing dataset from wireless
signals. Table II illustrates the three features of the testing data
used in this paper, and Figure 4 illustrates the data points of an
ATD in two-dimensional domains. The position of the t-th data
point in the 3-dimensional space is (f (1)k [t], f
(2)
k [t], f
(3)
k [t]).
Note that the subscript k still implies that we are checking if
the k-th user is under attack. It should also be noted that our
testing data has not yet been labelled. In Figure 5, the impact
of T on the distribution of data points is shown. It can be
seen that the first data points are close together and hard to
be separated. However, the larger T , the more separable the
data becomes.
IV. ARTIFICIAL TRAINING DATA (ATD)
In this section, artificial training data (ATD) will be created.
The ATD used for SVM corresponds to the case of having both
the legal users’ CSI and the eavesdropper’s CSI. Meanwhile,
the ATD used for OC-SVM corresponds to the case of having
only the legal users’ CSI.
A. ATD for (Classical) SVM
The access point can create the ATD by imitating the uplink
phase. More specifically, we perform the following steps:
7Fig. 5. The distribution of data points in R2. The 1-st red dot and the 1-st blue cross are, respectively, positioned at
(
f
(1)
k|H1 [1], f
(2)
k|H1 [1]
)
and at(
f
(1)
k|H0 [1], f
(2)
k|H0 [1]
)
. Similarly, the 2-nd red dot and the 2-nd blue cross are, respectively, positioned at
(
f
(1)
k|H1 [2], f
(2)
k|H1 [2]
)
and at
(
f
(1)
k|H0 [2], f
(2)
k|H0 [2]
)
.
When the value of T increases, red dots tend to cluster together and become separable from blue crosses.
• Step 1: Start with k = 1.
• Step 2: Start with t̂ = 1.
• Step 3: Generate ĝk
dist
= gk, ĝE
dist
= gE and n̂ ∼ CN (0, IL).
Note that the notation X
dist
= Y implies that X and Y have
the same distribution.
• Step 4: Calculate
ẑk
[
t̂
]
=

∣∣∣√Lρuĝk [t̂ ]+ p†kn̂ [t̂ ]∣∣∣2 , non-attack∣∣∣√Lρuĝk [t̂ ]+√LρEĝE [t̂ ]
+p†kn̂
[
t̂
]∣∣∣2, attack
(19)
f̂
(1)
k
[
t̂
]
=
1
t̂
t̂∑
ς=1
ẑk[ς] =

f̂
(1)
k|H0
[
t̂
]
, non-attack
f̂
(1)
k|H1
[
t̂
]
, attack
,
(20)
f̂
(2)
k
[
t̂
]
=
∑t̂
ς=1 ẑk[ς]−
∑t̂
ς=1 |p†kn̂[ς]|2∑t̂
ς=1 |p†kn̂[ς]|2
=

f̂
(2)
k|H0
[
t̂
]
, non-attack
f̂
(2)
k|H1
[
t̂
]
, attack
, (21)
f̂
(3)
k
[
t̂
]
=
t̂∑
ς=1
ẑk[ς] =

f̂
(3)
k|H0 [t̂ ], non-attack
f̂
(3)
k|H1 [t̂ ], attack
. (22)
• Step 5: We stick the label (#0) to the t̂-th data
point
(
f̂
(1)
k|H0
[
t̂
]
, f̂
(2)
k|H0
[
t̂
]
, f̂
(3)
k|H0
[
t̂
])
in order to im-
ply that user k is not under an attack. In con-
trast, we stick the label (#1) to the t̂-th data point(
f̂
(1)
k|H1
[
t̂
]
, f̂
(2)
k|H1
[
t̂
]
, f̂
(3)
k|H1
[
t̂
])
in order to imply that
user k is under an attack.
• Step 6: Set t̂ = t̂+1 and repeat Steps 3-5. Go to Step 7 if t̂ >
T̂ . Herein, T̂ is a large number that can be freely determined
by designers. To make the ATD statistically reliable, we
choose T̂  T .
• Step 7: Set k = k+1 and repeat Steps 2-6. Stop the process
if k > K.
TABLE III
ARTIFICIAL TRAINING DATA (ATD) USED FOR CLASSICAL SVM
MEAN RATIO SUM Labels
f̂
(1)
k|H1 [1] f̂
(2)
k|H1 [1] f̂
(3)
k|H1 [1] (#1)
...
...
...
...
f̂
(1)
k|H1 [T̂ ] f̂
(2)
k|H1 [T̂ ] f̂
(3)
k|H1 [T̂ ] (#1)
f̂
(1)
k|H0 [1] f̂
(2)
k|H0 [1] f̂
(3)
k|H0 [1] (#0)
...
...
...
...
f̂
(1)
k|H0 [T̂ ] f̂
(2)
k|H0 [T̂ ] f̂
(3)
k|H0 [T̂ ] (#0)
Remark 3. The ATD for classical SVM is shown in Table III.
It will be used to train classical SVM models in this paper (and
any other supervised learning models). Those trained models
are then applied to the testing dataset in Table II, whereby
we can classify if the obtained signal is affected by an active
eavesdropper.
Remark 4. Different from T , we can let T̂ be a very
large number because T̂ belongs to an artificial process. For
example, in the uplink phase, the AP can request both user
k and Eve to send the same pilot vector pk three times
(i.e., T = 3) but cannot request them to send pk so many
times (e.g., T = 1000). However, for an artificial process at
the AP, it allows itself to receive a large number of copies
of pk as desired. With sufficiently large T̂ , we can reach
f̂
(1)
k [T̂ ]
/
ϕ
(1)
k ≈ 1, f̂ (2)k [T̂ ]
/
ϕ
(2)
k ≈ 1, and f̂ (3)k [T̂ ]
/
ϕ
(1)
k ≈ T̂ .
B. ATD for OC-SVM
While the ATD used for SVM contains two types of data
points (corresponding to two labels), the ATD used for OC-
SVM contains only one type of data point (corresponding to
one label). Obviously, the ATD used for OC-SVM can be
extracted from the ATD used for SVM by removing one label
and keeping the other label.
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ARTIFICIAL TRAINING DATA (ATD) USED FOR OC-SVM
MEAN RATIO SUM Labels
f̂
(1)
k|H0 [1] f̂
(2)
k|H0 [1] f̂
(3)
k|H0 [1] (#0)
...
...
...
...
f̂
(1)
k|H0 [T̂ ] f̂
(2)
k|H0 [T̂ ] f̂
(3)
k|H0 [T̂ ] (#0)
In practical use cases, OC-SVM is related to the case that
we do not have the perfect CSI of Eve. Thus, it is reasonable
to suppose that the ATD used for OC-SVM only includes
data points associated with the label (#0) (i.e., non-attack).
Obviously, if we only have the perfect CSI of legal users, we
can only simulate the virtual process of transmitting signals
from users to Alice and create (#0)-related data points.
Table IV, which is made of the last T̂ rows of Table III,
shows the ATD used for OC-SVM. Obviously, Table IV does
not include any data points associated with eavesdropping
attacks.
C. ATD Normalization/Whitening
Normally, SVM works with data within the range of [0, 1].
Thus, it is necessary for the AP to normalize all features in
training datasets. Normalizing (or whitening) makes all values
in a feature column fall within [0, 1]. More specifically, if a
certain feature column consists of values u1, u2, . . ., and uTtot ,
then the AP will need to run the following algorithm:
• Step 1: Find umin = min{u1, u2, . . . , uTtot} and umax =
max{u1, u2, . . . , uTtot}.
• Step 2: Compute utempk =
uk − umin
umax − umin where k ∈
{1, 2, . . . , Ttot}. Assign the temporary value utempk to uk
by letting uk = u
temp
k .
Applying the above algorithm to all feature columns in the
ATD, we can normalize the ATD before actually using SVM
classifiers. An important note is that if training data (i.e., the
ATD in this paper) is normalized, then testing data must also
be normalized accordingly.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present several numerical examples to
evaluate the proposed framework under specific settings. As
for the channel fading, we set up gk =
√
βkhk and gE =√
βEhE. Herein, βk and βE represent the large scale fading,
while hk ∼ CN (0, 1) and hE ∼ CN (0, 1) represent the small
scale fading.3
The time complexity depends heavily on the loss function
and the optimization method [29]. Using the big-O notation,
it is experimentally confirmed that if the implementation is
based on LIBSVM, the time complexity of SVM as well as
OC-SVM can be about O(T̂ 3tot) where T̂tot is the total number
of training samples in the ATD [30]–[32]. Our experiments are
executed in Python and the execution of each SVM/OC-SVM
classifier takes around 0.09 seconds for training an ATD-based
model and labelling data points in the testing data.
A. Examining T̂ , T , and 3 defined features
Table V compares the accuracy of RBF-based SVM (and
OC-SVM) classifiers in 4 different sub-cases:
• i) The input data, which is trained by SVM (and OC-
SVM) classifiers, only includes the 1-st feature column,
the 2-nd feature column, and the label column in Table
III. It means that we only classify data based on the
features MEAN and RATIO.
• ii) The input data includes the features MEAN and SUM.
• iii) The input data includes the features RATIO and SUM.
• iv) The input data is exactly the same as Table III
that contains all the three defined features, i.e., MEAN,
RATIO and SUM.
The results in Table V show that the accuracy increases with
T as well as with T̂ . The classification has the lowest accuracy
when the input data contains only the attributes RATIO and
SUM. Noticeably, case i) produces higher accuracy than the
whole ATD in some cases. Although SVM offers higher
3Although Rayleigh fading is used to model hk and hE, other types of
fading can also be used because the framework, presented in Sections III and
IV, is not limited to any specific type of fading.
TABLE V
THE KERNEL FUNCTION, WHICH IS MENTIONED IN (5), IS THE RBF KERNEL, I.E., K (xs,x) = exp{−γ ‖xs − x‖}. THE SVM PARAMETERS ARE
γ = 0.5 AND C = 1. THE OC-SVM PARAMETERS ARE ν = 0.02, γ = 0.001. SYSTEM PARAMETERS: K = 4, L = 10, ρu = 5, ρE = 3, βk = 1, βE = 1.
IN THE TABLE, THE SUB-CASES I), II), III) AND IV) CORRESPOND TO 4 SUB-CASES DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION V-A.
The accuracy of SVM (%) The accuracy of OC-SVM (%)
T̂ T i) ii) iii) iv) i) ii) iii) iv)
5 60% 70% 60% 60% 20% 25% 25% 25%
100 10 80% 85% 60% 80% 27.5% 50% 50% 50%
20 90% 87.5% 72.5% 90% 67.5% 70% 70% 70%
5 80% 80% 60% 60% 22.5% 25% 25% 25%
1000 10 90% 90% 70% 80% 45% 50% 50% 25%
20 95% 95% 77.5% 90% 65% 70% 70% 70%
5 80% 80% 60% 70% 25% 25% 25% 25%
5000 10 90% 90% 70% 85% 47.5% 50% 50% 50%
20 95% 95% 77.5% 92.5% 67.5% 70% 70% 70%
9Fig. 6. An illustration of 4 trained SVM models that correspond to four
different kernel functions (i.e., linear, RBF, polynomial (degree 3), and
sigmoid kernels). The cyan area and B markers relate to (#0), while the
brown area and ◦ markers relate to (#1).
accuracy than OC-SVM, we have to note that a comparison
between these two may be unfair due to the differences inher-
ent in these two approaches (e.g., (3) uses the regularization
parameter C, while (7) uses the parameter ν), and that OC-
SVM requires only the CSI corresponding the legal users.
There does not seem to be significant difference in accuracy
when using datasets with two features (i.e., the sub-cases i, ii
and iii) and a dataset with three features (i.e., the sub-case iv).
Another observation is that the sub-case i (without the feature
SUM) is better than the sub-case iv (with the feature SUM)
in the case of SVM. This observation implies that SUM is not
as useful as MEAN in terms of implementation. As discussed
in Remark 2, the limited value of T might cause our SVM
classifiers ineffective as expected.
Thus, we will use the input data, consisting of two features,
for training machine learning models in most of the remaining
numerical examples.
B. Examining 4 different kernel functions
Table VI shows the accuracy of 4 different SVM (and OC-
SVM) classifiers. These classifiers are based on
• linear kernel: K (xs,x) = 〈xs,x〉,
• RBF kernel: K (xs,x) = exp{−γ ‖xs − x‖},
• polynomial kernel: K (xs,x) = (γ〈xs,x〉+ r)d,
• sigmoid kernel: K (xs,x) = tanh (γ〈xs,x〉+ r).
The numerical results in Table VI shows that the RBF kernel
brings about the highest accuracy in all considered cases.
On the contrary, the sigmoid kernel has the lowest accuracy.
Herein, it should also be noted that we set r to 0 such that
the RBF, polynomial and sigmoid kernels are fairly treated.
In fact, when r and d are set to other values, the RBF kernel
might not be the best one any longer.
In need of illustrating the above-mentioned kernel functions,
we provide an intuitive comparison in Figure 6. The total
number of training samples is Ttot = 2T̂ = 400, i.e., 200
samples with the label (#1) and 200 samples with the label
(#0). SVM parameters: C = 1, γ = 5, and d = 3. The
system parameters are exactly the same as those used for Table
VI. We can see that the separating hyperplane in the case of
linear kernel is a straight line, while the three ones are curves.
Intuitively comparing all sub-figures, we can state that the
fourth sub-case is the worst when the majority of 400 training
samples are misclassified. This observation matches what has
been recorded in Table VI.
Similarly, Figure 7 illustrates 4 different OC-SVM models
with T̂ = 200, ν = 0.02 and γ = 0.001. We can see that there
are only ATD points corresponding to the label (#0) because
OC-SVM models are trained on data that has only one class
(i.e., one label).
C. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves
According to [33]–[35], true positive rate (or probability of
detection) is defined as
TPR =
True positive (TP)
Positive (Pos)
where TPR is the number of (#1)-labelled samples that is
correctly classified as (#1), and Pos is the total number of
actually (#1)-labelled samples. In contrast, false positive rate
(or probability of false alarm) is defined as [35]
FPR =
False positive (FP)
Negative (Neg)
where FPR is the number of (#0)-labelled samples that is
wrongly classified as (#1), and Neg is the total number of
actually (#0)-labelled samples.
TABLE VI
SVM PARAMETERS: C = 1, γ = 2, r = 0, AND d = 3. OC-SVM PARAMETERS: ν = 0.02 AND γ = 0.001. THE INPUT DATA INCLUDES THE FEATURES
MEAN AND RATIO (I.E., THE FEATURE SUM WILL NOT BE USED). SYSTEM PARAMETERS: K = 4, L = 10, ρu = 5, ρE = 3, βk = 1, βE = 1.
The accuracy of SVM (%) The accuracy of OC-SVM (%)
T̂ T Linear RBF Polynomial Sigmoid Linear RBF Polynomial Sigmoid
5 70% 80% 80% 40% 17.5% 22.5% 17.5% 17.5%
400 10 85% 90% 80% 40% 35% 45% 35% 35%
20 92.5% 95% 90% 27.5% 82.5% 95% 82.5% 77.5%
5 70% 80% 80% 40% 17.5% 22.5% 17.5% 17.5%
800 10 85% 90% 80% 40% 35% 45% 35% 35%
20 92.5% 95% 90% 27.5% 82.5% 95% 82.5% 77.5%
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Fig. 7. An illustration of 4 trained OC-SVM models that correspond to linear,
RBF, polynomial (degree 3), and sigmoid kernels. B markers are the ATD
points associated with the label (#0). The brown area is the area that contains
most of the ATD points B.
To plot the TPR against the FPR in the case of SVM, we
offer Figure 8 that contains three receiver operating character-
istic (ROC) curves.4 These ROC curves corresponds to three
cases:
• i) the input data includes MEAN and RATIO,
4A ROC curve will not applicable for OC-SVM because the training process
of an OC-SVM model suffers from a huge imbalance with only one class.
TABLE VII
THE INPUT DATA INCLUDES THE FEATURES MEAN AND RATIO. SVM
PARAMETERS: C = 1, r = 0, AND d = 3. OTHER PARAMETERS: K = 4,
L = 10, ρu = 5, βk = 1, βE = 1, (T̂ , T ) = (104, 15).
The accuracy of SVM (%)
ρE
ρu
γ Linear RBF Polynomial Sigmoid
0.05 70% 70% 80% 70%
0.1 0.5 70% 70% 70% 66.67%
5 70% 66.67% 66.67% 30%
0.05 86.67% 93.33% 50% 93.33%
0.5 0.5 86.67% 86.67% 76.67% 93.33%
5 86.67% 80% 86.67% 80%
0.05 96.67% 96.67% 80% 96.67%
1 0.5 96.67% 96.67% 96.67% 96.6%
5 96.67% 96.67% 93.33% 3.33%
TABLE VIII
THE INPUT DATA INCLUDES THE FEATURES MEAN AND RATIO. THE
OC-SVM PARAMETER ν IS SET TO 0.001. OTHER PARAMETERS: K = 4,
L = 10, ρu = 5, βk = 1, βE = 1, (T̂ , T ) = (104, 15).
The accuracy of OC-SVM (%)
ρE
ρu
γ Linear RBF Polynomial Sigmoid
1 36.67% 50% 36.67% 50%
0.1 10−3 36.67% 50% 36.67% 36.67%
10−6 36.67% 31.67% 38.33% 38.33%
1 48.33% 43.33% 48.33% 50%
0.5 10−3 48.33% 40% 48.33% 48.33%
10−6 48.33% 35% 45% 45%
1 50% 50% 50% 50%
1 10−3 50% 50% 50% 50%
10−6 50% 45% 43.33% 43.33%
Fig. 8. ROC curves and the areas under corresponding ROC curves in the
SVM regime.
Fig. 9. ROC curves and the areas under corresponding ROC curves in the
OC-SVM regime.
• ii) the input data includes MEAN and SUM,
• iii) the input data includes RATIO and SUM.
The parameters used for Figure 8 are as follows: C = 1,
γ = 0.5, T̂ = 5000, and T = 20. Other system parameters
remain the same as those in Table VI. The area under the
ROC curve (namely, AUC) is 0.91 in case i, 0.92 in case ii,
and 0.86 in case iii. As such, case ii is considered as the best
case, while case iii is the worst one.
In the case of OC-SVM, we offer Figure 9 to illustrate the
ROC curves and AUC values for the three cases i, ii and iii.
The parameters used for Figure 9 are as follows: ν = 0.02,
γ = 0.001, T̂ = 1000, and T = 20. Other system parameters
remain the same as those in Table VI. This figure also shows
that the case iii is the worst. In addition, the case i is preferred
to keep a low FPR and an acceptable TPR (e.g. FPR ≤
0.2 and TPR ≈ 0.6). Whereas, the case ii and iii are better
choices to have a higher TPR and an acceptable FPR (e.g.,
TPR ≥ 0.8 and FPR ≤ 0.4).
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D. Examining the relation between ρE and γ
Table VII and Table VIII show the relationship between the
eavesdropper’s power and the coefficient γ in the kernel func-
tions. The accuracy, in general, increases with ρE. For example,
the polynomial kernel in Table VII provides the accuracy of
70%, at
(
γ, ρEρu
)
= (0.5, 0.1), 76.67% at
(
γ, ρEρu
)
= (0.5, 0.5),
and 96.67% at
(
γ, ρEρu
)
= (0.5, 1). The similar observation,
however, does not hold for the fourth SVM classifier (based
on the sigmoid kernel) in Table VII, because we have 3.33%
at
(
ρE
ρu
, γ
)
= (1, 5) and 30% at
(
ρE
ρu
, γ
)
= (0.1, 5). Looking
into the accuracy in the sigmoid kernel case, we can find that
it has less stability than the remaining kernels. In fact, the
sigmoid kernel seems very sensitive to the change of γ.
Also in Table VII, the most stable and accurate scenarios
are corresponding to the linear and RBF kernels, in which the
linear kernel is independent of γ. As such, when considering
the impact of γ on the accuracy, we suggest examining the
RBF kernel other than the polynomial and sigmoid kernels. For
the RBF kernel, if γ takes a small value, then training samples
are considered similar; in contrast, if γ takes a large value,
then there is less similarity among training samples. Through
numerical results in Table VII, one can confirm again this
observation. For example, at a fixed value of ρEρu , the accuracy
increases when γ decreases. In addition, the accuracy increases
with ρEρu . These observations allow us to reach the valuable
insight in Remark 5.
Remark 5. For SVM models, if Eve uses low transmit power
to send pE to the AP (i.e., if ρE decreases), then the SVM
parameter γ should be small. We can understand that if Eve
transmits pE = pk with low power, she may try to make her
signals similar to the signals from user k such that the AP
fails to detect her presence. As mentioned above, to cope with
the similarity among samples (which are created by handling
the received signals at the AP), we set γ to a small value.
In Table VIII, we record that except for the linear kernel,
which is independent of γ, the most stable classifiers are
related to the polynomial kernel. At ρEρu = 0.1, the RBF seems
to be better than the polynomial and sigmoid kernels. However,
at ρEρu = 1, the 3 considered kernel functions do not show huge
difference in performance. Note that the decrease in γ will
lead to lower detection rate. This observation contrasts with
the observation for the SVM case.
E. Over-fitting problems: The impact of γ
In Figure 10, we make a comparison among four different
sub-cases corresponding to γ = {0.05, 1, 20, 400}. The total
number of training samples is equal to Ttot = 2T̂ = 400.
System parameters are the same as those in Table VI. Figure
10 illustrates the transformation of models when γ increases.
With γ = 400, we face an over-fitting problem due to the fact
that the fourth model learns so well and becomes too detailed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered a wireless communication system that
requires the uplink phase for authentication. Eve has been
Fig. 10. 4 trained SVM models correspond to 4 different values of γ in the
case of RBF kernel (with C = 1). The cyan area and B markers relate to
(#0), while the brown area and ◦ markers relate to (#1).
assumed to impersonate a legal user. To identify the presence
of Eve, we have introduced the ATD and employed SVM/OC-
SVM. The results have shown the following insights:
• i) The importance of formulating/defining features and con-
verting received signals into those features. In particular, we
have defined and compared three features, namely MEAN,
RATIO and SUM.
• ii) The impact of selecting kernel functions and SVM/OC-
SVM parameters. Throughout the paper, the sigmoid kernel
seems to be the worst kernel, while the RBF kernel appears
to be the best one in terms of accuracy and stability.
• iii) The impact of the length of both training and testing
datasets on the accuracy. We have shown that when T̂ and
T increase, the accuracy of the linear-kernel-based, RBF-
kernel-based, and polynomial-kernel-based SVM (and OC-
SVM) classifiers can be improved.
• iv) The impact of selecting γ in relation to the Eve’s power
has been presented (see Remark 5). We have also shown the
impact of selecting γ in relation to over-fitting problems.
The data obtained through our framework can also be fed into
other machine learning algorithms, such as Gaussian mixture,
random forest and isolation forest. So far, it has remained an
open issue when considering those algorithms for the PLS and
making a holistic comparison among them.
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